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1. Introduction
Singapore’s defence-industrial origins date back to independence from Britain in
1965. Although colonisation had acted to suppress the island state’s economic
transformation, it had also implanted strong positive forces that would project the
country forward to construct a powerful defence economy. These forces included
a functioning civil service, the rule of law and adoption of the English language.
In a country where 90 per cent of the population are of Chinese ethnic origin, the
primary language is English, not Mandarin. In the defence domain, however,
Britain had left precious little in the way of capability as arms had always been
sourced from the colonial power. On final departure in 1968, Britain’s military
forces left independent Singapore with no air force and navy, and just a meagre
army comprised of mostly Malay forces. Withdrawal was also combined with the
closure of Britain’s huge military base on the island, leading to the loss of 40,000
local jobs and a fifth of Singapore’s national income.1 This dealt Singapore a
destructive economic blow, and also left it facing a strategic calamity. This was
because surrounding the country was an arc of Islamic states that was, and is,
perceived as an existential threat to Singaporean sovereignty. Such fears in the
early decades following independence were fuelled by anti-Chinese riots and
killings in both Malaysia and Indonesia. Additionally, Singapore suffered
insecurity from intermittent regional frictions, including fishing and maritime
territorial disputes, ‘water wars’ with Malaysia and actual military conflict with
Indonesian armed forces during the latter’s aggressive Konfrontasi era. It is little
wonder, therefore, that Singapore felt vulnerable, and sought to quickly develop
indigenous military capability, including defence-industrial capacity.
Singapore’s response to such threats was strengthened by the election of
Singapore’s first prime-minister, Lee Kuan Yew, who proved a strong and
visionary leader. His view was that development must be defended, and resources
were allocated for the build-up of Singapore’s Armed Forces (SAF). A strategy
of deterrence was crafted, whereby Singapore would be viewed by aggressors as
a ‘poisoned shrimp’; that is, notwithstanding the small size of the country,
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potential combatants would be deterred from attacking due to unacceptable
casualties and damage that a powerful SAF would inflict upon them: “easy to
swallow but impossible to digest”. 2 An appropriate strategy was devised to
overcome demographic constraints that would emphasise transformative defence
innovation through niche military-technological ‘force multipliers’. 3 Civil-
military fusion was the intended result via high value dual-use technology
synergies. Technology is a critical component of Singapore’s success story, but
accommodating the process of accelerating and intensifying innovation is
investment into human capital. The energy and creativity of Singaporean
engineers and scientists is a significant consideration, influenced partially by the
strategic imperatives derived by the country’s small size, but also by a Chinese
socio-economic cultural that embraces such traits as Mianzi (saving and creating
face).4
Singapore’s small country defence-industrial model has proved remarkably
successful in catapulting the industry from a position of dependence some 50
years ago to the present status of industrial, competitive and innovational maturity.
Singapore’s underlying defence-industrial strength has expanded, pari passu,
with growth in the breadth and depth of its commercial economy. Table 1
evidences Singapore’s contemporary and comparative success as a defence
economic power. As a small nation bereft of natural resources, and with a
population of around just six million people, Singapore has constructed a
powerful economy, sponsoring an impressive military budget and housing the
world’s 40th biggest defence-industrial company. These defence economic
metrics cast all other major Southeast Asian neighbours into the shade and
compare favourably with the performance of other small countries which have
benefitted from a long history of industrial development and/or the possession of
vast amounts of oil and energy resources.





























10.1 324 5.6 55,236 3.3 1(40)
Southeas
t Asia




7.9 1,016 264.0 3,847 0.8 0
Thailand 6.1 455 69.0 6,594 1.4 0
Vietnam 4.9 224 95.5 2,343 2.3 0




Kuwait 6.7 120 4.1 29,040 5.8 0
Norway 6.3 399 5.3 75,505 1.6
2(81
&95)
Oman 8.4 73 4.6 15,668 12.1 0
Qatar 3.4 166 2.3 71,991 N/A 0
Sweden 5.5 538 9.9 53,442 1.0 1(32)
Switzerla
nd
4.6 679 8.4 80,190 0.7 1(73)
Source:SIPRI,2018Database(MILEX,MILEX/GDP), World Bank 2017
(Population, GDP, GDP Per Capita) Defense News, 2018 (top 100 companies)
By reference to Singapore’s strategic and policy environment, the purpose of this
chapter is to explore the development of the island state’s defence-industrial base
set against the broader defence economic context. Discussion begins with an
overview of defence spending, procurement and defence-industrial development
patterns. This is then followed by the articulation of a quadrilateral defence-
industrial model that captures the principal influences affecting the development
of Singapore’s defence economy. Taking each in turn, the core components
comprising strategic foresight, technological absorption capacity, exposure to
trade and foreign partnerships and defence offset will be explained and analysed.
The chapter closes by offering a brief prognosis on the future prospects of
Singapore’s defence industry.
2. Evolution of defence-industrial structures
Other than some basic in-country maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO)
provision for British and allied forces during WWII, Singapore possessed no
defence-related manufacturing capacity until the late 1960s. The turning point
was the election of Lee Kwan Yew and his determination that Independence
would be defended, as far as was feasible by indigenous capability. Sovereignty
would not be undermined by the capriciousness of foreign powers imposing arms
embargoes when political considerations supersede strategic partnerships. It was
inevitable, therefore, that defence industrialisation would be encouraged, but
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from the outset local defence companies would not benefit from direct
government subsidies.5
The defence-industrial development process began in 1967, with the
establishment of Chartered Industries, the first of three divisions that would later
(1989) become the state-owned Singapore Technology (ST) Corporation.
Chartered Industries commenced production of several different types of
ammunition and small arms, and gradually expanded capacity to include artillery
shells and armour-piercing rounds for the AMX-13 tank’s main gun. In 1976, CI
purchased the rights of the SAR-80 assault rifle from Britain’s Sterling Armament
Company. The rifle was upgraded, and some 100,000 indigenously modified
SAR-80s were produced for local and export use.6 ST’s second division was
established in 1973, to locally design and produce mortars derived from a Finnish
model. The division later produced the Israeli supplied M68 155mm howitzer,
which was later locally modified and exported as the FH-88. Finally, in 1971, ST
Automotive Engineering was launched to modify imported Mercedes heavy
three-ton trucks to military spec standard. Foreign armoured personnel carriers,
such as the US-supplied M-113, were additionally modified to serve as platforms
for locally developed mortars and foreign supplied surface-to-air missile systems.
In 1974, the Singaporean government formed Sheng-Li Holdings to provide
strategic oversight and management of the island state’s rapidly expanding
defence-industrial base. The policy focus was not only on land systems, but also
the separate and rapidly evolving naval and aerospace entities. In the naval
domain, Singapore Shipbuilding and Engineering was launched in 1968, and
through overseas technology transfer agreements, quickly developed warship
production. A major partnership was with West Germany’s Lürssen Werft,
leading to the license production in 1974-5 of TNC-45 missile-equipped gunboats
that accommodated Israeli-produced Gabriel missiles. In 1989, the same German
company provided the design and a prototype vessel for the local construction of
five corvettes that integrated US Harpoon ship-to-ship missiles. Aerospace was
serviced by the Singapore Aerospace Corporation. The company was created in
1981 for local assembly of Italian supplied SIAI-Marchetti S-211 trainer aircraft,
and also the provision of MRO for numerous types of military aircraft, engines
and avionics equipment, including refurbishment of the American supplied A-4S
Skyhawk fighter and depot-level maintenance of C-130 transport aircraft.
In 1990, in a move to promote organisational synergies, Sheng-Li Holdings was
restructured and renamed Singapore Technologies (ST) Holdings. The thrust of
this restructuring was to commercialise operations, with ST in 1994 coming under
the control of the State Investment Company, Temasek. Through mergers and
acquisitions, ST rapidly developed a commercial portfolio that included
telecommunications, financial services, tourism and transportation. Singapore’s
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defence industry was clustered into what was called ST Engineering (ST Engg),
as part of a deliberate plan to diversify and cross-thread its functions into
appropriate commercial activities across the expanding ST conglomerate. ST
Engg became a publicly listed company, with Temasek Holdings owning a 51 per
cent controlling share. ST Engg is presently structured into four major companies,
namely - ST Aerospace, ST Marine, ST Electronics and ST Kinetics. The holding
company has over the past five years derived most of its revenues and net profits
from aerospace, followed by electronics, land systems and marine.7 Significantly,
ST Engg has evolved from a sole focus on the domestic market to operating as a
global multinational defence company, with operations spread across the globe.
In 2017, ST Engg employed 22,000 workers in 22 countries that generated
S$6.62bn in revenue and S$511.9mn in profit.8 The company is a success story,
ranked 40th in the world’s top 100 defence companies.
Figure 1: Singapore Defence Expenditure, 1988-2017
Source: Extracted from Speech Transcript by Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng
Hen at the Ministry of Defence Committee of Supply Debate 2018, Ministry of
Defence, Singapore, 2 March 2018, at:
https://www.mindef.gov.sg/web/portal/mindef/news-and-events/latest-
releases/article-detail/2018/march/02mar18_speech1 (accessed on 16 September
2018). Data are shown in current prices.
2. Procurement profile
Notwithstanding defence funding pressures, ST Engg has embarked on an
ambitious post-2030 ‘Road Map’ for a manpower-lean military capability aimed
at doing more with less.9 Detailed analysis of programme costs is not possible
because Singapore’s defence acquisition spending is secret, and thus the figures
have never entered the public domain. It is clear, though, that the continuous and
costly procurement of ‘big ticket’ platforms from foreign vendors, with whom ST
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Engg plays an important collaborative role, is a major undertaking. Aside from
contributing to various programmes across land, air and naval systems domains
through partnerships with foreign vendors, ST Engg has assumed the prime
contractor role for major locally developed platforms. These include the Next-
Generation Armoured Fighting Vehicle that will be an upgraded - more capable
- version of ST Kinetics Bionix infantry fighting vehicle; 10 and there is a
possibility of a local build for, firstly, the navy’s Multi-Role Combat Vessel
(MRCV), slated to replace the venerable (in-service since the late 1980s) Victory-
class missile corvettes, and, secondly, the planned Joint Multi-Mission Ship
(JMMS) that will offer larger and improved aviation capacity compared to the
locally-built Endurance-class landing platforms dock vessels. The procurement
process for these vessels will likely follow the conventional model of the lead
ship being built in a foreign yard, with remaining units produced domestically
under licence. Singapore’s major arms procurements since 1980 are shown in
Table 2. To date, there are no reported plans to initiate indigenous programmes
for major platforms. This can be attributed to both the absence of economies of
scale and less-than-guaranteed export prospects, with SAF the only secure client
for such complex systems and platforms.
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2005 USA S-70B Seahawk
shipborne helicopters
6
2007 Germany Leopard-2A4 main
battle tanks
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2007 USA F-15SG Strike Eagle
multi-role fighters
12 US$1 billion deal












2010 USA F-15SG Strike Eagle
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2013 USA S-70B Seahawk
shipborne helicopters
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2014 Spain A330 MRTT
refuelling aircraft
6
2014 USA F-15SG Strike Eagle
multi-role fighters
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Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, at:
https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers (accessed on 22 October 2018).
Note that the Carvin I-V programmes constitute the republic of Singapore Air
Force procurement of US F-16 fighter aircraft, including the provision of
training at the Luke Air Force base in Arizona. 22
3. Unique defence-industrial ‘ecosystem’
Singapore’s defence-industrial ecosystem is framed by reference to an expanded
definition of national security. The model was likely influenced by Japan’s
‘comprehensive’ security approach that has been in place since the beginning of
the 19th century Meiji era (1868-1912).11 The Japanese interpreted security as a
composite of economic, technological, military, diplomatic, political and related
fields of competence. Comprehensive security embraces defence, including
defence industrial capability, but this represents just one of multiple security
competences, rather than equating to national security itself. Singapore has a
similar Total Defence concept that has been forged on the same national security
anvil, covering the conventional elements of economic, civil and military defence,
but additionally there are elements of social and psychological defence, reflecting
the country’s diverse ethnic minority groupings From the perspective of this
chapter, Total Defence reflects the Singapore government’s desire to interlace the
defence (security) and economic (prosperity) objectives, to ensure that defence
investment is not quarantined from the wider economic community. It is,
therefore, instructive that across ST Engg’s four subsidiary companies, only
kinetics is dedicated to military outputs. The other three, aerospace, maritime and
electronics, are civil-military, and functionally organised so that skills and
learning acquired on military programmes are transfused into ST’s wider
commercial and more profitable activities.12
Located within the Total Defence space is Singapore’s ‘defence ecosystem’. The
concept was first coined by Quek Tong Boon (Deputy Defence Secretary for
Technology and Transformation) in 2006. He defined it in terms of the
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interdependency and co-evolution between the country’s users, developers and
producers of defence equipment. 13 Although the ‘users’ (i.e. the SAF) do
participate in the choice of system design, logistical requirements and other
related issues, its absence of operational combat experience limits the extent of
its contribution, and likely negatively impacts on defence export prospects, also.
In the context of this chapter, therefore, perhaps a more relevant concept is a
Singaporean ‘defence-industrial ecosystem’, reflecting the quadrilateral
stakeholder relations between: firstly, policymakers and funders (government);
secondly, developers, comprising the labyrinth of defence-related R&D
organisations; thirdly, producers (defence industry); and, fourthly, the network of
trading partners and collaborators, operating within a globalised environment.
Whilst there also exists a high level of interdependence between each of these
constituent parts, importantly, the defence industry assumes the role of pivotal
player in transforming ideas and designs into ‘teeth end’ technological capability;
indeed, it endorses the notion posited by Bilveer Singh that the defence industry
is the fifth (military-related) arm of Total Defence.14 At the core of Singapore’s
defence industry is ST Engg, sponsoring the cumulative and evolutionary
incubation and then maturity of indigenous defence technologies into a ‘secret
technological edge’ for use against potential aggressors.15 This approach eschews
the comprehensive development and production of platforms, but rather aims to
develop high technology defence systems that can be integrated into platforms
procured from overseas. However, to ensure this technological edge acts as a
deterrent, its possession and deployment must be secret. This strategic posture
was aptly described by Singapore’s former President, S.R. Nathan, when he stated:
“we must develop indigenously…a technological edge…and this must be
developed secretly - in strict secrecy - so that nobody knows the kind of defence-
related technology and capability that we have developed”.16 Yet, logically, the
possession of a technological edge must be an ‘open secret’, as to deter potential
aggressors they must be aware of the profound defence capability that faces them,
albeit that the precise configuration and impact remains unspecified
Figure 2, below, illustrates that the promulgation of an indigenous defence
technological edge that emerges through internal interactions of the ecosystem’s
quadrilateral relations, particularly government-inspired strategic foresight and
R&D investment. The defence-industrial ecosystem also comprises external
drivers, such as overseas trading partners and collaborators (exposure to
competitive pressures) and defence offset (technology infusion), which
additionally contribute to the technological ‘superiority’ goal. A further influence
comes from the aforementioned defence policy imperative that places a premium
on technology multipliers through organic and overseas procurement of advanced
weapons systems as a means of compensating for the restricted supply of military
personnel. This search for technological superiority is a characteristic of
Singaporean developmental strategy, implemented through the government’s
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interventionist role. It is a process of proactive central planning in which the
economy has been nurtured to progress rapidly through successive development
stages from agriculture, manufacturing, services and finally knowledge-intensive
transformation. The strategy encourages cultivation of incipient high technology
industries, such as information, computer, telecommunications, defence and
aerospace. The development of these ‘strategic’ industries has been catalysed
through foreign direct investment and technological partnerships. Government
policy emphasis has been on access to overseas technology to sustain and
generate local skills and innovation. The result of this development strategy has
been to secure a civil-military status best described by the metaphor, ‘rich nation,
strong army’.17




The Singapore government has always played a proactive role in identifying and
sponsoring the growth and development of ‘leading’ sectors within the local
economy. These may be described as growth poles, industrial pillars, champion
industries, or most often ‘strategic’ industries. Such industries are viewed as
powerful development catalysts, because of their important contributions to
skilled employment, high sales, enhanced value added, knowledge-intensive
output and strong backward industrial linkages. This interventionist development
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process goes back to the early post-independence era, but accelerated in 1991 by
the launch of a Strategic Economic Plan.18 The Plan highlighted eight strategic
thrusts, including human resource development, international partnerships and
investment, R&D and the promotion of industrial and technological clusters.
Complementing the Strategic Plan was a Science and Technology Plan that
invested billions of Singapore dollars into increasing the numbers of researchers
and R&D capacity in both the civil and defence sectors. Defence and aerospace
were viewed as integrative strategic industries, enjoying technological synergies
that straddle the civil-military divide. The Economic Development Board (EDB)
acted as the Singaporean equivalent of Japan’s post-WWII MITI (Ministry of
Trade and Industry) that sought to identify and orchestrate the development of
strategic industrial sectors. For example, the EDB developmental model
facilitated the creation of an advanced industrial aerospace cluster at the site of
an old WWII Seletar airfield. This has attracted huge numbers of local and foreign
high technology players, including global companies like General Electric (US),
Lockheed Martin (US), Boeing (US), Thales (France), and Rolls-Royce (UK);
the latter establishing assembly and testing facilities for its Trent family of aero-
engines, creating over 2,000 skilled jobs.19 EDB’s ‘visible hand’ intervention in
fostering the Seletar cluster proved a major instrumental factor in the project’s
success. Horizon scanning is a further crucial task of the EDB in its role of
identifying the future emergence of new and dynamic military and/or civil
strategic sectors.
A case in point is the space industry. Singapore was a late entrant into this high
technology industry, but was attracted by the obvious high skill and capability
spin-offs. Its entry started modestly with a 2003 locally built satellite X-SAT.
Since then, Singapore has launched a series of different small satellites ranging
from 1kg to 400kg in weight, and notably involving local university students in
the R&D process.20 Presently, the local space industry employs 1,000 people
across 30 companies. Its principal sponsor is the EDB, which established an
Office for Space Technology and Industry (OSTIn) in 2013. Following the tried
and tested approach of harnessing local and foreign expertise, Singapore’s space
quest has enjoyed some early successes. For example, NTU scientists have
developed a new tiny radar camera chip that is 100 times smaller than the current
200kg radar cameras, yet capable of capturing radar images regardless of light or
weather conditions; it is touted to be about 20 times cheaper to produce and
consumes 75 per cent less power.21 In January 2018, DSO National Laboratories
and NUS jointly launched the Satellite Technology and Research Centre (STAR)
to develop distributed satellite systems capabilities, focused on multiple small
satellites, each weighing a tenth of conventional satellites, either in formation or
constellation. The new centre will also train undergraduates and graduate students
to meet the manpower needs of the country’s space industry.22 DSTA and ST Egg
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have also partnered in early 2018 to acquire a new earth observation satellite, DS-
SAR, with a synthetic aperture radar-imaging payload.
Technology Absorptive Capacity
The concept of technological absorptive capacity has regard to the spectrum of
capabilities in an economy that facilitate local innovation. In the main, this
includes possession of highly skilled scientists, engineers and design staffs,
knowledge institutions, technology-based universities and specialised institutes,
supply chains and R&D capacity. Since independence, Singapore has prioritised
investment into human capital, created the development of world class
universities, promoted overseas education of its best scholars and sought to
nurture the rapid evolution of small medium size enterprises that act to deepen
development of innovative supply chains and R&D. Due to its small size, and
hence lack of scale opportunities, Singapore has pursued ambitious plans to
elevate the role of technology progress, especially on the defence science and
technology front. “Singapore can lead in defence technology, even though we are
small,” said Defence Minister Ng in 2017, revealing that the country has a 5,000-
strong community of defence engineers and scientists, and has plans to fund a 40
per cent increase in scholarships and awards by 2025.23 A critical push factor in
positioning Singapore as a global player in defence technologies is the Defence
Science and Technology Agency (DSTA). The Agency is a statutory board under
MINDEF, whose aim is to harness and exploit science and technology to provide
technological and engineering support for the defence and national security needs
of Singapore. It implements defence technology plans, acquires defence
equipment and supplies and develops defence infrastructure for the Ministry.
DSTA works closely with DSO National Laboratories. This is Singapore’s largest
defence R&D organisation, aimed at developing technological solutions to
sharpen the cutting edge of Singapore's national security. These R&D
establishments operate as part of a technological web of local universities, the
Agency for Science, Technology and Research (A*STAR), and other related
government agencies, such as the Government Technology Agency of Singapore
(GovTech), the Cyber Security Agency of Singapore, the National Research
Foundation, and also the EDB.
The Singaporean Government does not disclose annual expenditure on defence
R&D. However, in November 2001, the then Deputy Prime Minister and Defence
Minister, Dr Tony Tan, revealed that Singapore spends about 4 per cent of its
defence budget on long-term R&D endeavours.24 This relatively high proportion
seems about right, given Singapore’s priority on the development of frontier
defence technologies. The 4 per cent proportion applies to direct defence R&D
through MINDEF’s leading institutions, and in particular the DSTA and DSO
National Laboratories. Additionally, ST Engg invests in R&D, though it is
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difficult to determine how this is split between the military and civilian sectors,
especially given the advanced state of dual-use technologies developed and
produced by the company. The ST Electronics CEO and President, Seah Moon
Ming, stated in late 2007 that 7 per cent of the company’s annual revenue was
spent on customer-funded research; for instance, when SAF pays ST Engg to
source and develop specific solutions and allows it to use the technology for
purposes beyond the original project. Internally, ST Engg allocates about 3 per
cent of its annual revenue for R&D, though certain divisions such as electronics
spend more. Seah argues that R&D investment is a critical corporate dynamic,
and if it falls below 5 per cent, then there is an inability to renew products, systems
and capabilities.25
A third stream of defence-related R&D funding derives from the Singapore
Government R&D allocations to university and polytechnic institutions. Since
2002, the budget supporting collaboration between premier local R&D
institutions, such as A*STAR and ST Engg, was S$80mn. Additionally, DSTA
established a S$20mn Technology Innovation Fund, extending defence-related
R&D funding to small and medium enterprises.26 More recently, in early 2014,
MINDEF collaborated with Nanyang Technological University to establish an
Office of Research and Technology in Defence and Security to coordinate the
over 120 defence and security projects worth about S$130 million across five
university research institutions. 27 ST Engg also collaborates with local
universities in fostering R&D that has civilian and military applications. For
example, in May 2012, ST Kinetics invested S$3 million in Singapore's Republic
Polytechnic to establish the Advanced Composite Engineering Lab (ACEL). This
laboratory specialises in composite material science research and production, and
is possibly the first in Southeast Asia to specialise in natural fibre studies. The
defence-industrial ecosystem also actively promotes overseas collaboration to
obtain expertise from foreign research institutions. For example, the Campus for
Research Excellence and Technological Enterprise (CREATE) was established
at the National University of Singapore (NUS) in 2007 by the National Research
Foundation to forge security-related R&D collaboration between local and
premier foreign research institutions. 28 In February 2017, the National
Cybersecurity R&D Laboratory (NCL) was launched at NUS with the support of
the NRF’s National Cybersecurity R&D Programme, serving as a test-bed for
creative cybersecurity solutions and a one-stop platform providing ready-to-use
tools and environments for cybersecurity research and training.
Contemporary R&D programmes reflect pragmatism regarding Singapore’s
long-term national security perceptions, foreseeable market opportunities and in
no small part are driven by Singapore’s long-term concern about its military
manpower woes. Accordingly, policy emphasis on promoting capability in key
niche R&D areas, covers, for instance: 1) emerging technologies including
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artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, cyber and additive manufacturing (or more
commonly known as 3D printing); 2) unmanned systems; and 3) commercial
space technologies. Towards the ultimate objective of indigenising R&D
programmes, MINDEF initiated a seed grant of S$45 million per annum for
DSTA and DSO National Laboratories to undertake AI and robotics R&D.29
R&D programmes in these niche areas seek to exploit the latent expertise at the
six local universities, especially in unmanned systems and related technological
innovations, and there have been early successes. For example, NUS researchers
have developed an Aerial Unmanned Vehicle – MantaDroid – that looks and
swims like a manta ray, using only single motors and flexible fins to propel it
through water.30 NTU has been studying how to develop drones that act as air
traffic management systems.31 Separately, DSTA and ST Engg are collaborating
to develop technologies to minimise manning requirements on board the navy’s
Independence-class Littoral Mission Vessels (LMVs). Additionally, DSTA and
ST Kinetics unveiled in late 2016 a 10-variant Belrex family of Protected Combat
Support Vehicles (PCSVs), tentatively targeted at the export market.32 Finally, to
publicise Singapore’s niched capability in the development and production of
unmanned aerial, ground and maritime systems, DSO National Laboratories is
known to have developed the Meredith 400 autonomous underwater vehicle
(AUV) for mine countermeasures operations.
Exports and foreign partnerships
Singapore is not one of the world’s major defence exporters, not least because
overseas arms sales have proved something of a balancing act, with the economic
benefits derived from such exports often subordinated to the government’s
diplomatic imperative of maintaining a neutral stance in international affairs,
generally, and conflict, specifically. As a result, export performance has been
mixed. In the MRO field, Singapore is one of the world’s leading providers,
especially in aerospace, but across the broader military sectors performance has
been less spectacular. Table 3 shows some notable patterns. During the Cold War,
nearly all exports comprised ST Marine built naval vessels, such as simple coastal
patrol and landing craft, along with other miscellaneous fleet auxiliaries; yet, the
numbers built were modest. It was only after the Cold War ended that arms
exports diversified beyond the naval sphere to include some land systems. This
appeared to be at the cost of naval export volumes, even if some limited export
successes were achieved in sales of more advanced vessels. For instance, one
Endurance-class LPD (HTMS Ang Thong) was built for Thailand, but the option
for a second unit was never exercised due to Bangkok’s funding constraints. This
was the largest warship ever exported by Singapore. A far smaller export
programme was the four-ship Al-Ofouq class offshore patrol vessel sale to the
Royal Navy of Oman, which was completed in 2016.
Table 3: Singapore’s Major Arms Exports
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Year Recipient Weapon Quantity Remarks











1978 Kuwait LC-32m landing craft 3
1979 Thailand Chula-class fleet tanker 1
1980 Oman Saba Al Bahr-class landing
craft
1






1983 Bangladesh PB-46 patrol craft 2




1985 Sri Lanka LC-33m landing craft 2
1986 India Tara Bai-class patrol craft 6 Including 4
units built in
India
Sri Lanka Hansaya-class transport
craft
2




1987 Brazil Grajau-class patrol craft 4
1988 Sweden Smit Manila cargo ship 1 Uto
1990 Sri Lanka LC-33m landing craft 2
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Vosper Type-A/B 3 Second-hand
2000 Sri Lanka Standard 120mm mortar 9 Second-hand
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2002 Indonesia Jupiter-class diving
support tender
1 Second-hand




UAE SRAMS 120mm self-
propelled mortar
48












2011 UAE SRAMS 120mm self-
propelled mortar
72




Unknown SRAMS 120mm self-
propelled mortar
25
2015 UAE SRAMS 120mm self-
propelled mortar
24
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Arms
Transfers Database, at: https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers (accessed
on 16 September 2018)
Other recent export successes include a major contract to supply a modified
variant of the ST Kinetics’ Bronco all-terrain tracked carrier (ATTC), designated
Warthog, for the British Army’s deployment in Afghanistan. Singapore’s 120mm
Super Rapid Advanced Mortar System (SRAMS) also found success with the
United Arab Emirates, a return customer, ordering 96 units in total. There have
also reportedly been unspecified sales, especially of small arms and light weapons
(SALWs), to foreign clients. Singapore-made SALWs have seen some modest
export successes, mainly to the developing world. But not all such sales have been
properly documented, meaning that Singapore’s SALW exports could be more
than what has been reported thus far. For example, unknown quantities of
Singapore-made SALWs, such as the Armbrust infantry light anti-tank and
personnel weapons, found their way into the conflict-ridden Balkans in the
1990s.33 In 1998, Chartered Industries of Singapore reportedly shipped a whole
prefabricated arms factory to Myanmar and established, with Israeli consultancy
assistance, the military junta-ruled country’s SALW development and production
capacity.34 In 2005, Papua New Guinea authorities launched a probe into an
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illegal consignment of Singapore-built SAR-21 assault rifles along with six 30-
round magazines and 500 rounds of 5.56mm SS109 ammunition, which were
seized by Air Nuigini security personnel at Jacksons International Airport.35
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Singapore embarked on a quest to carve out
new overseas markets through a series of mergers and acquisitions. However,
these efforts were characterised by a number of high profile failures to clinch
major deals, such as the Bionix IFV bid for the US$7bn Army Interim Armored
Vehicle programme. ST Engg also sought to acquire American firms, including
ST Marine’s 2002 acquisition of VT Halter Marine and the ST Engg 2009
acquisition of US subsidiary, VT Miltope. Such mergers and acquisitions reflect
ownership of foreign entities that allow a direct ‘in’ to the US market. Another
form of tie-up with foreign industrial capability is via technology partnerships.
Singapore has performed exceedingly well, here, collaborating with other ‘small’
states, such as Israel, in niched business areas that include military aircraft
retrofitting, upgrading and civilian conversion. ST Engg has been awarded open
competition contracts to upgrade C-130J heavy lift aircraft belonging to the
Turkish and New Zealand air forces. This is a capability that ST Aerospace has
developed, even though it does not produce aircraft (with the notable exception
of the EC-120 Colibri light helicopter through a joint venture with China and
France, enjoying some export success). ST Aerospace has also achieved major
successes in the upgrade of legacy fighter jets serving some foreign air forces.
For example, it tied up with other foreign firms in 1999 to upgrade Brazilian and
Turkish F-5 air force jets. Additionally, ST Aerospace worked with Thai Aviation
Industries on the Falcon One cockpit and avionics upgrade programme to
modernise part of the Royal Thai Air Force’s fleet of F-16A/B Fighting Falcon
multi-role fighter jets in 2006.
Defence Offset
Beginning in the 1970s, Singapore embarked on the task of constructing a strong
and diversified domestic defence-industrial base, and the authorities quickly
recognised the contribution that defence offset could make,36 especially with
respect to fostering creation of capacity and enhancing worker skill sets.
MINDEF followed a non-typical offset approach, and instead of designing and
publishing a prescriptive policy, allowing overseas defence contractors sight of
the regulations, the policy document was only available for internal consumption.
This means that the offset authority and the offshore vendor commenced
negotiations with a clean sheet of paper on each and every procurement
programme. Predictably, the Singaporean bargaining position was always
rigorous and demanding, but there would likely be greater opportunities for
compromise, dependent upon the scale of procurement. From modest beginnings,
Singapore’s defence offset investments have grown considerably, and most offset
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observers would argue that the country now hosts one of the world’s most
successful offset regimes.
The earliest offset programme occurred in 1970, when Chartered Industries
agreed a nine-year deal to license produce 80,000 American M16 assault rifles
for the SAF.37 In the decades since then, Singapore has engaged in far more
ambitious offset agreements. For example, the naval programme to build six
Formidable class stealthy frigates based on the French La Fayette design was
linked to an offset arrangement that not only allowed Singapore to build five of
these warships locally, under licence, but the country’s primary defence
technology institutions, the Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA)
and Defence Science Organisation (DSO) National Laboratories, collaborated
with their French partners on frontier stealth technology R&D. As would be
expected, these ‘silver bullet’ defence R&D programmes are undertaken in
complete secrecy. A further interesting maritime case study on the strategic
approach MINDEF planners adopt when acquiring and then absorbing the
overseas technologies in the local development of defence capability relates to
submarine procurements. Singapore’s initial acquisition of submarines were the
A12 Sjöormen class, all acquired second-hand from the Royal Swedish Navy,
mainly to serve as training platforms to support RSN attempts to build an
undersea warfare capacity. The boats were refurbished and tropicalised for the
local operating environment, and then recommissioned into RSN service as the
Challenger class. The second batch of submarines acquired from Sweden was the
pair of A18 Västergotland class boats, which were larger than the A12s, and built
in the 1980s, hence newer. They were refurbished and modernised to the same
standards as the Swedish Navy’s Södermanland class, with an AIP section
inserted midships, before being recommissioned as the Archer class. ST Engg
Marine gained considerable expertise from interactions with Swedish submarine
engineers, especially partnering on the integration of modern electronic systems.
This progression of learning has enabled Singapore to scale the specialised
submarine technology ladder in preparation for the next higher learning stage
associated with the more recent acquisition of the navy’s customised Type-
218SG submarines built by the German shipbuilder TKMS.38
4. Future prospects
This chapter has explored and evaluated the principal attributes of Singapore’s
unique defence-industrial ecosystem. The successful push for defence
industrialisation was spurred by strategic vulnerability. The interpretation of
national security that highlights the contribution of economic, technological and
military components ensured that the high cost of defence and aerospace
development was funded by robust economic growth. Moreover, the search for
technological security was facilitated by a parallel policy emphasis on promoting
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synergistic civil-military industrial and technological integration. The
government’s proactive support of strategic industries sponsored via intensive
investment into the creation of deep technological absorptive capacity, especially
high level R&D capability, has powered the defence and aerospace sectors into
scaling higher technology stages. At the core of this defence-industrial ecosystem
is ST Egg, which, through elevated levels of competitiveness and innovation, has
catalysed rapid market expansion, and positioned the company at 40th in the
world’s top 100 defence companies. The development of Singapore’s defence-
industrial base has also been assisted by infusion of advanced technologies and
learning through the process of defence offset. The diffusion and absorption of
these offset-related technology transfers has proved effective principally because
of the spectrum of diverse technology capabilities permeating Singapore’s
technology absorptive capacity. The one disappointing component within the
quadrilateral defence-industrial ecosystem as conceptualised in this chapter is
defence export performance. This will likely see dramatic improvement in future
years, as ST Engg belatedly forges an international ‘brand’. The company can be
expected to pursue a nuanced and niched civil-military focus to capture not only
the export of specialised high value upgrades, MRO and conversion programmes
but also broader security-related sales of space, aerospace and artificial
intelligence systems. There is no logic in tampering with the policy mechanics
behind Singapore’s defence industrial success, and through continued local and
overseas strategic partnerships there is the expectation that the success story will
endure. The chapter ends by asking the obvious question as to whether the model
is transportable. It is possible, but would require emulation of not just the policy
frameworks and institutional structures but also the cultural dynamics.
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